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CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
COOPERATION FOR THE UNITED STATES IN THE MIDDLE
EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: EXTRADITION AND
ITS ALTERNATIVES
DAViD P. WARNER*
I. INTRODUCTION
N the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, locating, appre-
hending and surrendering (or prosecuting) criminals is playing an obvi-
ous and more significant role for the United States and those countries
within the Middle East and North Africa with which the United States his-
torically has not maintained active bilateral law enforcement relation-
ships.' Newspapers and other publications are replete with stories that
highlight governments' efforts to ensure that fugitives, particularly those
associated with terrorism, terrorist financing and narco-terrorism, are
brought to justice or, alternatively, that impunity is confronted where the
fugitive is found.
2
* Mr. Warner is a senior trial attorney in the Office of International Affairs,
Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice. He holds a joint degree (J.D./
M.A.) in law and international affairs from the American University. He received a
B.A., summa cum laude, in International Studies from the Ohio State University and
a Diploma in Hispanic Studies (Diploma de Estudios Hispdnicos, sobresaliente) from
the Complutense University of Madrid. Mr. Warner also studied at the Hague
Academy of International Law. He clerked for the U.S. Immigration Court in
Chicago, Illinois and advised the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals. Other
Department experience includes serving as the Department of Justice Attache at
the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, Mexico and as a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney in
the Southern District of California. Mr. Warner appeared at the symposium in his
personal capacity and, therefore, the observations that he made and the views and
conclusions contained in this Article are his own and do not necessarily represent
those of the U.S. Department of Justice or the U.S. government.
1. For purposes of this Article, the Middle East and North Africa includes
those countries of the Levant (including Israel, though, as noted below, not a
country of focus for this Article), Iran, Iraq, those of the Arabian Peninsula and
African countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. Israel is not a focus of this
Article because the law enforcement relationship between the United States and
Israel is not typical of those between the United States and other countries within
the region. When possible, references to Palestine (West Bank and Gaza) are in-
cluded. "Bilateral law enforcement relationships" refer to routine police-to-police
or prosecutor/investigating judge-to-prosecutor/investigating judge communica-
tion concerning ordinary criminal or criminal-related process between the
United States and a particular country. Whether and to what extent the United
States and a particular country might communicate outside law enforcement chan-
nels is beyond the scope of this Article.
2. See Dan Eggen &Jerry Markon, Hamas Leader; 2 Others Indicted, WASH. PosT,
Aug. 21, 2004, at A4 (exploring support in context of criminal enterprise); Mary
Fitzgerald, Iraqi Charged with Lying on Petition for U.S. Citizenship, WASH. POST, Aug.
31, 2004, at A15 (covering prosecution of alleged foreign agent under false state-
(479)
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In a part of the world where bilateral extradition treaties with the
United States are few and lack vigor, efforts to locate, apprehend and sur-
render fugitives face many challenges. 3 Highlighting those challenges and
drawing attention to appropriate alternatives is the focus of this Article.
4
The first section will draw attention to the United States' bilateral law en-
forcement relationships within the Middle East and North Africa before
September 11 and highlight noteworthy changes that have taken place
since that time.5 It will also focus on extradition between the United
States and countries within the region.6 In the second section, the Article
will identify alternatives to extradition and the role they can play between
the United States and other countries in the region, regardless of the exis-
tence of a treaty. 7 The final section will focus on considerations the U.S.
ments offense); Michelle Garcia, N. Y. Attorney Testifies in Own Terrorism Trial, WASH.
POST, Oct. 26, 2004, at A15 (focusing on prominent prosecution in New York,
which includes terrorist's attorney as defendant); Germans Grab Syrian Linked to Al
Qaeda, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2004, at A16 (disclosing arrest on behalf of Spanish
government for terrorist financing); Ahmed Haj, Yemen Convicts 15 on Terror
Charges, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2004, at A22 (highlighting prominent terrorism trial
in Yemen); Jamal Halaby, Zarqawi Among 13 Indicted by Jordan in Plot, WASH. POST,
Oct. 18, 2004, at A15 (noting military charges for plot to attack U.S. Embassy in
Amman,Jordan); Colum Lynch, U.N. Approves Anti-Terrorism Initiative, WASH. POST,
Oct. 9, 2004, at A26 (calling Member States to "prosecute or extradite anyone who
supports or engages in terrorism"); Jerry Markon & John Mintz, Plot to Kill Saudi
Ruler Admitted in U.S. Court, WASH. PosT, July 31, 2004, at Al (reporting guilty plea
related to assassination plot of Saudi crown prince); Caryle Murphy, Saudis Plan
Terror Case Against Va. Man, Family Says, WASH. POST, July 30, 2004 at A9 (noting
material support case in Saudi Arabia); Nation in Brief/New DEA Exhibit Ties Drug
Use to Financing Terrorist Groups, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2004, at A2 (focusing on
agency's efforts to highlight nexus between narcotics trafficking and terrorism);
1998 Bin Laden Order Allowed Into Tial WASH. POST, June 13, 2004, at A18 (report-
ing on prominent material support case); Leef Smith, Man Pleads Guilty in Passport
Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2004, at A13 (highlighting charity linked with terrorist
financing results in board member defendant pleading guilty to illegally possessing
and using U.S. passport to enter United States); World News in Brief/Cairo, WASH.
POST, Sept. 19, 2004, at A33 (reporting Egypt's detention of students allegedly
linked to Muslim Brotherhood).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2004) (identifying countries with which United States
has bilateral extradition treaties, including Egypt, Iraq and Jordan); see also United
States v. Perez-Cestero, 737 F. Supp. 752, 754-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (detailing efforts
government pursues to locate and apprehend fugitives).
4. Cf David P. Warner, Bringing White-Collar Fugitives toJustice--Fugitive Appre-
hension and Return and Obtaining Evidence Abroad, 11 U.S.-MEX. L.J. 171, 172-73
(2003) (underscoring challenges to fugitive apprehension and return in context of
U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship).
5. For further discussion of the United States' bilateral law enforcement rela-
tionships in the Middle East and North Africa before and after September 11, see
infra notes 9-18 and accompanying text.
6. For further discussion of extradition treaties between the United States and
countries in the Middle East and North Africa, see infra notes 19-64 and accompa-
nying text.
7. For further discussion of alternatives to extradition between the United
States and countries in the Middle East and North Africa, see infra notes 65-113
and accompanying text.
[Vol. 50: p. 479480
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government and governments in the region might wish to draw on to pro-
mote bilateral law enforcement relationships between and among them-
selves to facilitate fugitive location, apprehension and return. 8
II. BACKGROUND
Before the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C.,
the bilateral law enforcement relationship between the United States and
Middle Eastern and North African countries was limited at best.9 U.S. law
enforcement agencies with overseas offices, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), 10 the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 11 and
8. For further discussion of possibilities to promote bilateral law enforcement
relationships in the Middle East and North Africa, see infra notes 114-32 and ac-
companying text.
9. See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security & Claims of
the Committee of the Judiciary, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2004) (statement of Roderick L.
Beverly, Special Agent in Charge, Office of International Operations, FBI) [herein-
after Beverly Testimony] (underscoring growth of FBI personnel throughout Mid-
dle East and North Africa, as well as office openings in Abu Dhabi, United Arab
Emirates, Tunis, Tunisia and Sanaa, Yemen), available at http://www.fbi.gov/con-
gress/congress03/beverly051303.htm.
10. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) presence overseas is well-docu-
mented. See, e.g., FBI, Your Local FBI Office/Legats (noting that FBI has forty-eight
country offices and six sub-offices with law enforcement cooperation responsibility
in fifty-two countries, including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and United
Arab Emirates), at http://www.fbi.gov/contact/legat/legat.htm (last visited Jan.
26, 2005); FBI, The FBI Workforce/By the Numbers (reporting that more than two
hundred agents and support staff serve in attach& offices overseas), at http://
www.fbi.gov/page2/aug04/workforce082504.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). State
Department diplomatic agents are also posted throughout the region.
Agencies with overseas representation, but none physically in the Middle East
and North Africa, include the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF),
the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), Secret Service and Coast Guard. See ATF, U.S.
Dep't of Treasury, Fact Sheet (June 2, 2001) (noting that former Treasury Bureau-
nowJustice Department entity-has attaches in Canada, Mexico and Colombia), at
http://www.state.gov/t/ pm/rls/fs/2001/3773.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005);
USMS, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, International Investigations (identifying overseas offices
in Mexico, Dominican Republic and Jamaica), at http://www.usmarshals.gov/in-
vestigations/international/index.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005); U.S. Secret Serv.
(USSS), U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, USSS Field Offices (indicating that Secret
Service now has fifteen offices overseas), at http://www.secretservice.gov/
fieldoffices.shtml#over (last visited Jan. 26, 2005); U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard International Affairs Mission (calling attention
to Coast Guard's international efforts), at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-ci/intl.htm
(last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
The U.S. Department of Justice has temporarily stationed prosecutors in Iraq
as resident legal advisors. Compare U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Sends
25 Advisors to Iraq in Support of Provisional Authority Effort to Reconstruct Criminal Sys-
tem, May 20, 2003, at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/May/03-ag-267.htm,
with U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Criminal Div., Office of Int'l Affairs (noting that Depart-
ment of Justice's (DOJ) Office of International Affairs has field offices only in
Rome, Italy, Mexico City, Mexico and San Salvador, El Salvador), at http://
www.usdoj.gov/criminal/oia.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
11. Although the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) office in Cairo is the
DEA's exclusive physical representation in the Middle East and North Africa, it
3
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the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 12 (BICE, the suc-
cessor agency to the U.S. Customs Service) had practically no physical rep-
resentation in the Middle East and North Africa; other law enforcement
agencies had none. The FBI had offices with defined oversight in Cairo,
Egypt and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, but its offices in Paris, France and Athens,
Greece otherwise shared principal oversight over the region. 13 Police
communications outside represented agencies often took place on case-
specific investigations through Interpol, and prosecutorial/investigating
judge contacts tended to be specific to particular investigations and
prosecutions. 
1 4
Needless to say, the United States' approach to law enforcement
within the region is receiving greater focus.1 5 The FBI, for instance, has
expanded its representation in the Middle East and North Africa. In addi-
actively covers the region through its offices in Nicosia, Cyprus, Rome, Italy and
Islamabad, Pakistan. See DEA, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Foreign Cooperative Investigations
(reporting that DEA operates in fifty-eight countries), at http://www.dea.gov/pro-
grams/fci.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
12. Until September 11, the BICE of the U.S. Department of Homeland Se-
curity followed the pattern of most law enforcement agencies and based its Middle
East and North Africa relations out of Rome, Italy. Opening an office in the
United Arab Emirates breaks from that pattern. See U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, Office of Int'l Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security (identifying
BICE offices abroad), at http://www.ice.gov/graphics/internationalaffairs/con-
tactt-z.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
13. The FBI also maintained an office in Tel Aviv, Israel, whose jurisdiction
also included Amman, Jordan. That has since changed. The FBI office in Am-
man, Jordan, now has oversight responsibility for Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Pre-
September 11 issues in the region that fell under no specific regional office were
handled by the FBI's office in Rome, Italy.
14. Interpol is an inter-governmental organization dedicated to disseminating
police information among its member states. See generally Interpol, at http://
www.interpol.int (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). Its constitution in part explains that
the mission of Interpol is to "ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assis-
tance between all criminal police authorities with the limits of the laws existing in
the different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights." IrrrERPOL, CONST. art. 2, available at http://www.interpol.int/Pub-
lic?ICPO/LegalMaterials/constitution/constitutionGenReg/constitution.asp#gp
(last visited Jan. 26, 2005). This is accomplished through an information ex-
change network of the National Central Bureaus of each of the member countries.
The United States' is called the U.S. National Central Bureau (USNCB), and all
countries in the Middle East and North Africa are members of Interpol and have
their own National Central Bureau. See 22 U.S.C. § 263a (2004) (providing statu-
tory authority for USNCB); see also U.S. Dep't ofJustice, U.S. Nat'l Cent. Bureau of
Interpol, Point of Contact for International Law Enforcement (underscoring liaison role
of USNCB), at http://www.usdoj.gov/usncb/ usncborg/mission.html (last visited
Jan. 26, 2005).
15. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COM-
MISSION ON TERRORIST ATTAcKs UPON THE UNITED STATES 361428 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] (emphasizing that "[c]ountering terrorism has
become, beyond any doubt, the top national security priority"); Report Details FBI's
Changed Priorities, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2004, at A23 (underscoring how focus on
countering terrorism and terrorism-related crimes is impacting organized crime
and white-collar prosecutions).
[Vol. 50: p. 479
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tion to Cairo, Egypt and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, the FBI reports that it has
offices in Amman, Jordan, Sanaa, Yemen and Abu Dhabi, United Arab
Emirates. Soon, it will add personnel in these locations and open new
offices in Tunis, Tunisia and Kuwait City, Kuwait. 16 BICE is now repre-
sented in Abu Dhabi. 17 Although DEA representation has not changed
physically in the region, efforts to focus on narco-terrorism within the re-
gion have. 18
III. EXTRADITION
Though police cooperation has changed in the wake of September
11, bilateral extradition relationships have not.19 Before September 11,
the United States had bilateral extradition treaties with Egypt, Iraq and
Jordan.20 These countries remain the United States' only extradition part-
ners in the region.
The extradition treaty with Egypt is one of the oldest bilateral extradi-
tion treaties in force for the United States. It is captioned in the name of
the Ottoman Empire, but neither country has disavowed its viability.2 1
16. See Beverly Testimony, supra note 9 (underscoring growth of personnel
throughout Middle East and North Africa); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (2004) (em-
powering FBI with investigative authority for terrorism matters).
17. See supra note 12 (identifying BICE offices abroad, including Abu Dhabi);
see also BICE, Iraqi Heritage: ICE Operations in Iraq (highlighting BICE activities in
Middle East, particularly Iraq), at http://www.ice.gov/graphics/investigations/
iraqi-heritage.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
18. See supra note 11 (identifying offices with regional responsibility); Hearing
Before Committee on International Relations, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (2004) (statement
of Karen Tandy, DEA Administrator) (noting development of Drug/Financial Fu-
sion Center in effort to combat terrorism), available at http://www.dea.gov/pubs/
cngrtest/ct021204.htm; Criminal Investigation, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, IRS Narcot-
ics-Related Investigations (showing link with DEA efforts to combat financial crimes
related to narcotics, including narco-terrorism), at http://www.treas.gov/irs/ci/
docnarcotics.htm#why (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (2004) (identifying U.S. bilateral extradition
treaties).
20. See Convention on Extradition, Aug. 11, 1874, U.S.-Ottoman Empire, 19
Stat. 572, T.S. 270 [hereinafter U.S.-Egypt Extradition Treaty]; Extradition Treaty
Between the Kingdom of Iraq and the Republic of the United States of America,
June 7, 1934, U.S.-Iraq, 49 Stat. 3380, T.S. 907 [hereinafter U.S.-Iraq Extradition
Treaty]; Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Mar. 28,
1995, U.S.-Jordan, S. TREATy Doc. No. 3, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), 1995 U.S.T.
LEXIS 215 [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan Extradition Treaty].
Though this Article does not focus on the U.S.-Israeli relationship, see supra
note 1, the United States has a bilateral treaty with Israel. See Convention on Extra-
dition Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the State of Israel, Dec. 20, 1963, U.S.-Isr., 14 U.S.T. 1707.
21. See U.S.-Egypt Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. VIII (containing auto-
matic renewal provision unless Party gives "six (6) months' previous notice of its
intention to terminate the same"). A recent International Narcotics Control Strat-
egy Report notes that the treaty is still in force. See U.S. Dep't of State, Int'l Narcot-
ics Control Strategy Rep. (INCSR) (Mar. 2004) (stating that Egypt and United
5
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The treaty is a list treaty,2 2 including eight crimes or categories of crimes
for extradition. 2 3 Because it is a list treaty, extradition cannot be sought
for many classes of crimes, such as terrorism-related crimes, unless an al-
ternative basis permits extradition. For instance, if Egypt were to seek an
individual's return to stand trial for financial crimes generically, the treaty
in its current form would unlikely accommodate a request from the peti-
tioning state. If the financial crime were linked to narcotics or narco-ter-
rorism, the requesting state could rely on Article 6(2) of the United
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics and Psychotropic
Substances as a basis to solicit the fugitive's return because both the
United States and Egypt are a Party to that Convention, which incorpo-
rates crimes identified in the Convention into the bilateral extradition
treaty.
2 4
States have had extradition treaty in place since 18[7]0s), available at http://
www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/voll /html/29839.htm.
22. Treaties are identified as list treaties, dual criminality treaties or hybrid
treaties. The U.S.-Egypt Extradition Treaty illustrates the first. See U.S.-Egypt Ex-
tradition Treaty, supra note 20. The U.S.-Jordan Extradition Treaty is an example
of the second. See U.S.-Jordan Extradition Treaty, supra note 20. The U.S.-Mexico
Extradition Treaty represents the third. See Extradition Treaty Between the United
State and Mexico, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter U.S-Mexico
Extradition Treaty].
23. Article II of the treaty enumerates the crimes or categories of crimes for
which extradition can be sought: (1) murder; (2) attempted murder; (3) other
violent crimes, such as rape, arson, piracy, mutiny; (4) burglary; (5) forgery (the
utterance of forged paper, counterfeiting of public, sovereign or government
acts); (6) fabrication or circulation of counterfeit money; (7) embezzlement of
public moneys; and (8) embezzlement of employer. U.S.-Egypt Extradition Treaty,
supra note 20, art. II.
24. See United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, art. 6(2), 28 I.L.M. 493 ("Each of the
offences to which this article applies shall be deemed to be included as an extradit-
able offence in any extradition treaty existing between Parties."), available at http:/
/www.unodc.org/pdf/ convention_1988_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
Egypt, Iraq and Jordan are parties to other multilateral instruments that pro-
vide similar provisions. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents,
Dec. 14, 1973, art. 8, T.I.A.S. 8532, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1981, 13 I.L.M. 41; Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23,
1971, art. 8, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, art. 8, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S.
105; Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, Sept. 14, 1963, art. 16, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219. Egypt and Jordan
are Parties to the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec.
18, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456. Article 10 of that treaty includes language that incorpo-
rates offenses into an existing bilateral extradition treaty as well. See id.
Once Egypt (and other treaty partners) becomes a Party to the United Na-
tions Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing, the extradition for
offenses covered under that treaty could be sought as well. See United Nations
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing, Jan 10. 2000, art. 11, 39
I.L.M. 268 ("The offences set forth in article 2 shall be deemed to be included as
extraditable offences in any extradition treaty existing between any of the States
484 [Vol. 50: p. 479
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Under the terms of the treaty, nationality can be a bar to extradi-
tion 25 (though the Egyptian Constitution apparently does not preclude
the prohibition of Egyptian nationals).26 Waiver or simplified extradition
are not expressly provided for in the treaty.27 Nor does the treaty contain
a provisional arrest provision.28 Specialty, however, is included in the
treaty.2 9 Notwithstanding the treaty's longevity, apparently neither coun-
try has invoked the treaty to seek a fugitive's extradition.
30
The treaty with Iraq dates to 1934. It, too, is an old list treaty, identify-
ing twenty-five crimes or categories of crimes for extradition.3 1 For obvi-
ous reasons, it had not been used before September 11, and neither Party
has endeavored to use it since the Coalition's departure in June 2004.32
Parties before the entry into force of this Convention."), available at http://
www.unodc.org/unodc/resolution_2000-02-25_ .html.
25. See U.S.-Egypt Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. VI (obligating neither
party to "deliver up its own citizens," though not foreclosing choice to do so).
26. Compare Ec.VPT CONST. art. 51 (stating that Egyptians cannot be exiled), at
http://www.uam.es/otroscentros/medina/egypt/egypolcon.htn (trans.) (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2005), with id. art. 53 (providing that asylees cannot be extradited).
27. Some extradition treaties include a provision that enables a fugitive to
forego extradition proceedings or consent to extradition summarily. See U.S.-Jor-
dan Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. 17 (providing basis to waive extradi-
tion); U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 22, art. 18 (establishing basis for
simplified extradition).
28. Authority to provisionally arrest enables a requested state to take a fugitive
into custody under urgent circumstances and places the requesting state under a
treaty-specified deadline to provide supporting documents. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184
(2004) (empowering judicial authority to issue warrant for arrest of individual
found in its jurisdiction who is believed to have committed extraditable offense);
U.S.-Jordan Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. 11 (4) (providing for fugitive's
provisional arrest); Warner, supra note 4, at 175 n.35 (discussing provisional arrest
and highlighting question of probable cause in provisional arrest context); see also
Thomas G. Snow, The Investigation and Prosecution of White-Collar Crime: International
Challenges and the Legal Tools Available to Address Them, 11 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
209, 221 n.41 (2002) (same).
29. One facet of the Rule of Specialty precludes a requesting state from prose-
cuting or punishing a fugitive for crimes other than those for which extradition
was sought and granted. See U.S.-Egypt Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. III
(providing that "the person or persons delivered up for the crimes enumerated in
the preceding article shall in no case be tried for any ordinary crime committed
previously to that for which his or her surrender is asked"); see also infra note 86
(discussing specialty).
30. One explanation might focus on the futility of seeking recourse under a
treaty that identifies so few crimes or classes of crimes. Another might reflect the
previously limited engagement between the United States and Egypt on interna-
tional law enforcement cooperation matters. A third might be grounded on the
kinds of challenges any extradition would inevitably generate. In any case, neither
Party has made much, if any, use of the treaty since its entry into force.
31. See U.S.-Iraq Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. II (specifying crimes,
such as murder, attempted murder, rape, arson, crimes committed at sea, burglary,
robbery, forgery, embezzlement, kidnapping, larceny, perjury or subornation of
perjury, fraud and bribery).
32. Coalition refers to the Coalition Provisional Authority, a military authority
that administered Iraq after the U.S.-led intervention toppled the regime of Sad-
7
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Extradition of nationals is discretionary under the treaty33 (and Iraq's cur-
rent constitution does not prohibit the extradition of Iraqi nationals). 34
Waiver and simplified extradition are not included in the text of the
treaty. Provisional arrest is contemplated under the treaty, 35 as is the rule
of specialty. 36
The U.S.-Jordan Extradition Treaty is clearly the most contemporary
of the three. It contains a dual criminality clause to permit the extradition
for any offense that is a crime and punishable by a prison sentence of
more than one year in both countries.3 7 Provisional arrest is contem-
dam Hussein. See National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, Dr. Condoleeza Rice
Discusses Iraq Reconstruction (Apr. 4, 2003) (outlining interim authority to over-
see Iraq after demise of Saddam Hussein government), at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/ 04/20030404-12.html. The Coalition
Provisional Authority ceased to exist on June 28, 2004, giving rise to an interim
government for Iraq. See President George W. Bush, President Bush Discusses
Early Transfer of Iraqi Sovereignty (June 28, 2004) (underscoring significance of
departure of Coalition Provisional Authority and installation of interim govern-
ment's leadership), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/
20040628-9.html.
33. See U.S.-Iraq Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. VIII (stating that
"neither of the High Contracting Parties shall be bound to deliver up its own
citizens").
34. See IRAQ INTERIM CONST. art. 1 (b) ("No Iraqi may have his Iraqi citizen-
ship withdrawn or be exiled unless he is a naturalized citizen who, in his applica-
tion for citizenship, as established in a court of law, made material falsifications on
the basis of which citizenship was granted."), at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/
icl/iz00000_.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
35. See U.S.-Iraq Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. XI ("The person provi-
sionally arrested shall be released, unless within three months from the date of
arrest in Iraq, or from the date of commitment in the United States of America,
the formal requisition for surrender with the documentary proofs hereinafter pre-
scribed be made as foresaid."). Three months is rather long and indeed most
treaties, where the provision exists, articulate a period that ranges between forty-
five and sixty days. See, e.g., infra note 38 (establishing sixty day limit); United
States Extradition Treaty with the United Kingdom, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art.
VIII, T.I.A.S. 8486, 28 U.S.T. 227 (requiring supporting documents within forty-
five days). Any of these periods might sound like an inordinate period of time.
From a practical perspective, notification of provisional arrest, document assembly,
translation, legalization and presentation are time consuming tasks.
36. The U.S.-Iraq Extradition Treaty states:
No person surrendered shall be tried for any crime other than that for
which he was surrendered without consent of the surrendering High
Contracting Party, unless he has been at liberty to leave the country one
month after the date of his trial, or, in case of conviction, after having
suffered his punishment or having been pardoned. This Article shall not
be applicable to crimes committed after the surrender.
Id. art. IV.
37. See U.S.-Jordan Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. 2(1) ("An offense
shall be an extraditable offense if it is punishable under the laws in both Con-
tracting States by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or by a
more severe penalty."). The U.S.-Jordan Extradition Treaty also covers lesser of-
fenses, provided lesser offenses are secondary to the principal crime for which
extradition is sought. See id. art. 2(5) ("If extradition has been granted for an
extraditable offense, it shall also be granted for any other offense specified in the
8
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plated under the terms of the treaty,38 as well as temporary and deferred
surrender, 39 specialty4 ° and waiver of extradition proceedings. 4 1 Unlike
the other two treaties, the Parties cannot invoke nationality as a basis to
refuse extradition. 4 2 Neither U.S. nor Jordanian law bars the extradition
of nationals.4 3 Though clearly the most legally flexible of the three trea-
ties, the U.S. government reports that the treaty has been used only once
since it entered into force.
4 4
Notwithstanding the absence of bilateral extradition treaties between
the United States and other countries within the region, domestic laws can
provide a basis to extradite fugitives4 5-particularly to rather than from
request even if the latter offense is punishable by deprivation of liberty for one
year or less, provided that all the other requirements for extradition are met.").
For major crimes, such as murder, kidnapping and robbery, the dual criminality
standard is generally met without difficulty. Where crimes simply are not yet de-
fined, such as cybercrime and cybersecurity, then an alternative basis for the fugi-
tive's return must be pursued.
38. See id. art. 11 (1) (providing that provisional arrest request "may be trans-
mitted through the diplomatic channel or directly between the Department ofJus-
tice in the United States and the Ministry of Justice in the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan" and explaining that "facilities of the International Criminal Police Organi-
zation (INTERPOL) may be used to transmit such a request"). A fugitive can be
provisionally arrested for two months, with the possibility of a month extension.
See id. art. 11 (4) (providing that "60 days can be extended an additional 30 days").
39. See id. art. 13 ("If the extradition request is granted in the case of a person
who is being proceeded against or is serving a sentence in the Requested State, the
Requested State may temporarily surrender the person sought to the Requesting
State for the purpose of prosecution . . ").
40. See id. art. 16 (identifying conditions relevant to specialty and its waiver).
41. See id. art. 17 ("If the person sought consents to surrender to the Request-
ing State, the Requested State may surrender the person as expeditiously as possi-
ble without further proceeding under this treaty.").
42. See id. art. 3 ("If all conditions in this Treaty relating to extradition are
met, extradition shall not be refused based on the nationality of the person
sought.").
43. Section 3196 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code states:
If the applicable treaty or convention does not obligate the United States
to extradite its citizens to a foreign country, the Secretary of State may,
nevertheless, order the surrender to that country of a United States citi-
zen whose extradition has been requested by that country if the other
requirements of that treaty or convention are met.
18 U.S.C. § 3196 (2004).
SeeJORDAN CONST. art. 21 (2) ("Extradition of ordinary criminals shall be regu-
lated by international agreements and laws."), available at http://
www.kinghussein.gov.jo/ constitution-jo.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). But see
id. art. 9(1) ("NoJordanian may be deported from the territory of the Kingdom.").
44. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep't of State, 2001
Patterns of Global Terrorism, at App. D (2001) (identifying Eyad Mahmoud Ismail
Najim as extraditee from Jordan in August 1995), available at http://
www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001 /html/ 10256.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
45. See Frank Main, Tunisia Returns Longtime Fugitive in Sex Abuse Case, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, at 3 (reporting extradition of fugitive to United States
"under the North African country's domestic extradition laws").
487
9
Warner: Challenges to International Law Enforcement Cooperation for the U
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2005
488 VILANOVA LAW REViEW [Vol. 50: p. 479
the United States.4 6 The requirements for extradition pursuant to a do-
mestic law often mirror the requirements set forth in a bilateral or multi-
lateral treaty and the domestic process under that law to effect the
fugitive's return is practically identical. 47 Tunisia, for instance, requires
receipt, through diplomatic channels, of a certified copy of the charging
46. With very limited exception, the United States can only extradite pursuant
to a treaty. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (a) (2004) (providing for surrender of persons to
requesting state "only during the existence of any treaty of extradition with such
foreign government"); id. § 3184 (conditioning authority to arrest fugitive in
United States on "treaty or convention for extradition between the United States
and any foreign government"); see also Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287
(1933) (affirming that "the legal right to demand [ ] extradition and the correla-
tive duty to surrender [a fugitive] to the demanding country exist only when cre-
ated by treaty").
As an exceptional measure, U.S. law contemplates the extradition of certain
individuals from the United States on the basis of comity. Section 3181 (b) of Title
18 of the U.S. Code states:
The provisions of this chapter shall be construed to permit, in the exer-
cise of comity, the surrender of persons, other than citizens, nationals, or
permanent residents of the United States, who have committed crimes of
violence against nationals of the United States in foreign countries with-
out regard to the existence of any treaty of extradition with such foreign
government if the Attorney General certifies, in writing, that-
(1) evidence has been presented by the foreign government that indi-
cates that had the offenses been committed in the United States, they
would constitute crimes of violence as defined under section 16 of this
title; and (2) the offenses charged are not of a political nature.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b) (2004).
Section 16 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code states:
The term "crime of violence" means-
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of an-
other, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a
substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of an-
other may be used in the course of committing the offense.
See 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2004).
Extradition pursuant to comity, however, applies to the return of third coun-
try nationals. See 18 U.S.C. § 3181(b). It does not apply to citizens, nationals (as
defined in Section 1101(a) (22) of Title 8 of the U.S. Code) or permanent re-
sidents of the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2004) ("The term 'na-
tional of the United States' means (A) a citizen of the United States, or (B) a
person who, though not a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance
to the United States.").
A fugitive can also be extradited to an international war crimes tribunal. See
Judicial Assistance to the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia and to the Interna-
tional Tribunal for Rwanda, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1342, 110 Stat. 486 (1996) (pro-
viding that extradition provisions of Title 18 of U.S. Code "shall apply in the same
manner and extent to the surrender of persons" to two international tribunals).
47. See CODE DE PROC9DURE PENALE [TUNISIAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]
arts. 308-35 (providing extraterritorial jurisdiction for crimes committed by or
against Tunisians outside Tunisia), available at http://www.jurisitetunisie.com/
tunisie/ codes/cpp/235.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005); see also CODE DE PROC-
DURE PtNALE [ALGERIAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] arts. 694-720, in K
BENMIZIANI, CODE DE PROCtDURE PENALE (1988); EXTRADITION, CODE DE PROCt-
DURE PtNALE [MOROCCAN EXTRADITION LAw] arts. 1-35, in Collection "Textes et Docu-
10
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document and warrant, the text of the offenses with applicable penalty
provisions, the text of the statute of limitations and identification informa-
tion (in the form of photograph and, if available, fingerprints). 48 Once
received by the Foreign Ministry and accepted by the Ministry of Justice, a
particular court in Tunis then determines whether the requesting country
has provided sufficient material to show that an extraditable offense was
committed or that the fugitive was convicted of an otherwise extraditable
offense and that the person sought is the likely perpetrator or convict.
49 If
the court concludes that the material is sufficient, then the Executive de-
cides, in its discretion, whether to deliver the individual to the requesting
state. 50 Otherwise, the court's conclusion is final and the fugitive is re-
leased. 5 1 Tunisian law does not prescribe a particular period of time to
complete this process.52
Even assuming a viable extradition relationship, pursuing extradition
often generates challenges.5 3 The offense for which extradition is sought
may not be "covered" under a list treaty or the elements of the offense for
which extradition is sought may not mirror the same or similar offense in
menrts," in PUBLICATIONS DE LA REVUE MAROCAINE D'ADMINISTRATION LOCALE ET
DPEVELOPMENT 223 (2001).
48. See TUNISIAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 47, art. 316 (stat-
ing information Tunisia requires from requesting country).
49. See id. arts. 317-18 (indicating how court reviews potential extradition).
50. See id. (stating what court does if material is sufficient for extradition).
51. See id. art. 323 (stating that court's decision is final and fugitive is released
if it decides material is insufficient for extradition).
52. See id. arts. 308-35 (providing no prescribed period for process).
53. In the United States, extradition proceedings are akin to probable cause
hearings and are considered quasi-criminal. The detainee is regularly appointed
counsel, but other rights afforded a criminal defendant, such as bail, are unavaila-
ble to fugitives facing extradition. See Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 62 (1903). In
Wright, the Court stated:
The demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the
law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue
of the proper warrant, and the other government is under obligation to
make the surrender; an obligation which it might be impossible to fulfil if
release on bail were permitted. The enforcement of the bond, if for-
feited, would hardly meet the international demand; and the regaining of
the custody of the accused obviously would be surrounded with serious
embarrassment. And the same reasons which induced the language used
in the statute would seem generally applicable to release pending
examination.
Id.
Since Wright, courts have crafted a special circumstances exception to this
rule, but courts have rarely invoked this exception. See, e.g., In re Requested Extra-
dition of Terence Damien Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Extra-
dition of Yechiel Heilbronn, 773 F. Supp. 1576, 1581-82 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
Moreover, the fugitive has no right to speedy trial, discovery or even cross-
examination of witnesses testifying at the hearing. The fugitive may seek to de-
scribe the information before the judge, but otherwise, the fugitive's right to pre-
sent evidence is limited. See Wright, 190 U.S. at 60-62.
11
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the requested country.54 In these cases, the requested country will give
particular scrutiny to the underlying facts and circumstances alleged in the
request. 55 Other challenges might be grounded in procedure, such as
whether a statute of limitations to prosecute or serve a sentence has run.
56
Criminals often espouse an argument to claim that an offense is political
or that the request is politically motivated.
57
A country's legal system may impose extra-treaty requirements, often
based on a constitutional norm. The U.S.-Egypt Extradition Treaty, for
instance, provides that the "President of the United States, or the proper
executive authority in [Egypt], may then issue a warrant for the apprehen-
54. Nomenclature often differs for financial offenses, and countries tend to
approach conspiracy-as an offense-differently from the United States.
55. See U.S.-Jordan Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. 2(3). Article 2(3)
reads:
For purposes of this Article, an offense shall be an extraditable offense:
(a) whether or not the laws in the Contracting States place the offense
within the same category of offenses or describe the offense by the same
terminology; or (b) whether or not the offense is one for which United
States federal law requires the showing of such matters as interstate trans-
portation, or use of the mails or of other facilities affecting interstate or
foreign commerce, such matters being merely for the purpose of estab-
lishing jurisdiction in a United States federal court.
Id.
56. The U.S.-Egypt Extradition Treaty is silent on this point. The U.S.-Iraq
Extradition Treaty bars extradition "when from lapse of time or other lawful cause,
according to the laws of the place within the jurisdiction of which the crime was
committed, the criminal is exempt from prosecution or punishment for the crime
for which the surrender is asked." U.S.-Iraq Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art.
V. The U.S.-Jordan Extradition Treaty takes a completely distinct approach, pre-
cluding the requested state from considering its or the requesting state's statutes of
limitation. See U.S.-Jordan Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. 6 ("The decision
whether to grant the request for extradition shall be made without regard to provi-
sions of the law of either Contracting State concerning lapse of time."); Cf U.S.-
Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 22, art. 7 (providing that "[e] xtradition shall
not be granted when the prosecution or the enforcement of the penalty for the
offense for which extradition has been sought has become barred by lapse of time
according to the laws of the requesting or requested Party") (emphasis added). Al-
gerian, Moroccan and Tunisian domestic extradition laws follow this principle. See
ALGERIAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 47, arts. 612-617; MOROCCON
EXTRADITION LAw, supra note 47, arts. 689-691, at 158-59; TUNISIAN CODE OF CRIMI-
NAL PROCEDURE, supra note 47, art. 312.
57. All three bilateral treaties in the region contain a political offense excep-
tion. See, e.g., U.S.-Egypt Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. III (providing that
"treaty shall not apply to any crime or offence of a political character"); U.S.-Iraq
Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. III (including "provisions of this Treaty shall
not import claim of extradition for crimes of a political character"); U.S.-Jordan
Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. 4(1) ("Extradition shall not be granted if the
offense for which extradition is requested is a political offense.").
Even if the fugitive does not espouse a political offense or make a claim that
the request is politically motivated, the requested country may make the case on
the fugitive's behalf. Political motivation is also often raised in public corruption
cases. See World in Brief, Mexico City, Wash. Post, Sept. 3, 2004, at A13 (reporting
extradition of Rogelio Montemayor, "the disgraced former head of Mexico's state
oil monopoly, Pemex, to face corruption charges in his homeland").
12
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sion of the fugitive, in order that he may be brought before the proper
judicial authority for examination." 58 Nevertheless, under U.S. law, a
competent court-not the Executive-determines whether probable
cause exists to issue a warrant and, if appropriate, orders that the warrant
be issued. 59
Notwithstanding the inevitable challenges associated with extradition,
the Rule of Non-Inquiry offers those governments that can seek extradi-
tion from the United States motive to solicit surrender through a treaty.
60
The Rule of Non-Inquiry narrowly limits what a U.S. court can analyze in
an extradition proceeding. Under the Rule, "courts refrain from investi-
gating the fairness of a requesting nation's justice system and from inquir-
ing into the procedures or treatment which await a surrendered fugitive in
the requesting country."6 1 Courts have considered creating an exception
to the Rule, an exception courts will certainly continue to consider as fugi-
tives face possible return to a region of the world where efforts to promote
legal reform face challenges. 62 A viable Rule of Non-Inquiry, however,
ensures that the Secretary of State can continue to make the foreign policy
decision whether to extradite a fugitive to a particular country, 63 provid-
58. See U.S.-Egypt Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. V.
59. Section 3184 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code states:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the
United States and any foreign government ... any justice or judge of the
United States, or any magistrate judge authorized so to do by a court of
the United States, or anyjudge of a court of record of general jurisdiction
of any State, may .... issue [a] warrant for the apprehension of the per-
son so charged [with having committed within the jurisdiction of any
such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such treaty or
convention], that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or magis-
trate judge, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and
considered.
18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2004).
What is required to obtain a warrant in the context of a provisional arrest
request has received greater scrutiny. See Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758,
773, op. withdrawn en banc, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998) (questioning standard to
obtain provisional arrest). But the premise itself-the government's ability to de-
tain an international fugitive while awaiting supporting documents from the re-
questing State-has withstood challenge. See United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549,
553-54 (8th Cir. 1984) (affirming basic legitimacy of provisional arrest).
60. The Rule of Non-Inquiry refers to the judicially-created principle that
reserves questions of procedures and treatment of the prospective extraditee to
the executive. See United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103, 120 (1st Cir. 1997)
(explaining rule); In re Extradition of Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir. 1989)
(same).
61. See Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d at 120 (internal quotes and citations omitted); id.
at 109-10 (recognizing foreign policy considerations rather than considerations
particular to individual facing extradition).
62. See Aljazeera.net, In Pursuit of Arab Reform (May 20, 2004) (highlighting
challenges to promoting reform within region), at http://english.aljazeera.net/
NR /exeres/967715B8-276C-4708-AC08-7FD102E 13BA7.htm.
63. See Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d at 111 ("It is not that questions about what awaits
the relator in the requesting country are irrelevant to extradition; it is that there is
another branch of government, which has both final say and greater discretion in
13
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ing the U.S. government with necessary flexibility as it seeks to advance law
enforcement cooperation efforts throughout the region.
6 4
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO EXTRADITION
Because extradition treaties with the United States in the region are
few and lack vigor, alternatives to extradition must be considered to en-
sure that fugitives are brought to justice and that impunity is combated.6 5
A criticism of employing alternatives to surrender fugitives is that other
vehicles are irregular or disguise extradition. The duty to surrender, or
dedere, however, does not foreclose a broader interpretation that includes
alternatives to extradition, especially in the absence of an extradition
treaty or in light of a treaty or domestic extradition legal impediment to
return a fugitive. 66 Accepting the narrower interpretation means that
these proceedings, to whom these questions are more properly addressed.") (foot-
notes omitted).
64. Cf Cornejo-Barreto v. Siefert, 218 F.3d 1004, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2000)
(providing fugitive with opportunity to challenge Secretary's decision to surrender
"when asserting prospective likelihood of torture, if extradited"). Ramiro Cornejo-
Barreto, a Mexican national and lawful permanent U.S. resident, was the subject of
an extradition request from Mexico. Id. at 1007. Mexico solicited Cornejo-Bar-
reto's return so he could stand trial for murder and other crimes. Id. A magistrate
judge certified Cornejo-Barreto for extradition. Id. at 1008. Cornejo-Barreto ap-
pealed, seeking habeas relief from the district court. Id. In his petition, Cornejo-
Barreto made multiple arguments, including that extraditing him to Mexico would
violate United States' obligations under the Convention Against Torture. This is
the sole claim he asserted on appeal before the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 1009. He
argued that federal implementing legislation for the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment (CAT) or, in the alternative, the CAT itself superseded the Rule of Non-
Inquiry and accordingly prohibited the United States from surrendering him to
Mexico. Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the finding of extraditability, but also
found that the federal law implementing the CAT provided the court a basis to
review the Secretary of State's surrender warrant, if he in fact were ordered surren-
dered. Id. at 1012-17.
The Secretary of State subsequently issued the surrender warrant against
Cornejo-Barreto and legal challenges ensued. Appeals were withdrawn and deci-
sions arising from the legal challenges were vacated. See Cornejo-Barreto, 379 F.3d
1075 (9th Cir. 2004), rehearing granted en banc, 386 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. Oct 19, 2004),
and opinion vacated on rehearing by, 389 F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. Nov. 19, 2004).
Notwithstanding the above, courts have not denied an extradition based on a
humanitarian exception or a finding that procedures or punishments an extradite
might face are "'so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require
reexamination'" of the Rule of Non-Inquiry. Cornejo-Barreto, 218 F.3d at 1010 (cita-
tions omitted).
65. SeeWarner, supra note 4, at 172-74 (favoring alternatives to extradition for
apprehending and returning white-collar fugitives).
66. See Colleen Enache-Brown & Ari Fried, Universal Crime, Jurisdiction and
Duty: The Obligation ofAut Dedere AutJudicare in International Law, 43 McGILL L.J.
613, 625-26 (1998) ("Even in the cases in which no extradition treaty has been
signed between the host state and the state requesting the return of the alleged
offender, an obligation on the part of the host state to take action is present.").
Moreover, the argument assumes that dedere embodies a particular notion of pro-
14
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criminals can find safe haven in those countries where a bilateral extradi-
tion relationship with the United States does not exist or an impediment
under a treaty or domestic extradition law arises. 6 7 Even assuming a treaty
basis to extradite, governments' pursuing these acts in the first instance
can ensure a fugitive's more immediate return. 68 An immediate return
manifests an asylum state's desire to deny safe haven to international fugi-
tives and concomitantly promotes collective action to combat impunity
directly.
69
Cases demonstrate that fugitives-particularly fugitives with ample re-
sources-exploit multiple means to evadejustice. 70 To limit fugitives' mo-
bility, governments need to ensure that legal mechanisms are in place to
frustrate or impede fugitives' travel. 7 1 These mechanisms should include
denying or revoking a visa or passport. 72 Denying or revoking a visa may
cess. See, e.g., Ann Powers, Justice Denied? The Adjudication of Extradition Applications,
37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 272, 291 (2002) (advocating more process for extraditees).
67. See Melanie M. Laflin, Kidnapped Terrorists: Bringing International Criminals
to Justice Through Irregular Rendition and Other Quasi-Legal Options, 26 J. LEGIS. 315,
325 (2000) (identifying argument that alternatives "circumvent[ing] the formal
process of extradition" violate human rights of fugitive); see also Enache-Brown &
Fried, supra note 66, at 625-26 (underscoring states' obligation of non-asylum for
universally condemnable crimes); MichaelJ. Kelly, Cheating Justice by Cheating Death:
The Doctrinal Collision for Prosecuting Foreign Terrorists-Passage of Aut Dedere Aut
Judicare into Customay Law & Refusal to Extradite Based on the Death Penalty, 20 ARIz.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 491, 494-500 (2003) (noting that sentence conflicts might con-
vert requested state into safe haven).
68. For examples, see infra note 85; see also Lalin, supra note 67, at 329
("These forms of rendition prove to be faster and less expensive than the full extra-
dition procedure.").
69. See Enache-Brown & Fried, supra note 66, at 629-30. The authors argue:
If the principle of aut dedere autjudicare is not considered a norm in inter-
national law, what results is the unlikelihood of punishment of a perpe-
trator of a universally condemnable crime where the host state is not a
party to a treaty which contains an obligation to take action. The obliga-
tion to take action is a condition precedent for any criminal legal system's
validity, particularly in respect of the validity of a given prohibition.
Id. at 631-32.
70. See Warner, supra note 4, at 171 (illustrating complexities of bringing
white-collar fugitives to justice). Two major white-collar fugitives from Mexico are
Oscar Espinosa Villarreal, who fought extradition in Nicaragua, and Carlos Cabal
Peniche, who fought extradition in Australia. See id. at 171 n.2 (noting examples).
71. Mechanisms also include border security measures. See, e.g, 9/11 COMMIs-
SION REPORT, supra note 15, at 564 n.36 (drawing attention to biometrics); Many
Get Reprieve Over Passports, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2004, at A4 (reporting that millions
of visitors will receive one-time reprieve should they seek to enter without pass-
ports that are now required to be scannable); Sylvia Moreno, Border Security Mea-
sures to Tighten Next Month, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2004, at A21 (reporting
implementation of biometric screening on November 15, 2004); Robert
O'Harrow, Jr. & Scott Higham, 2-Fingerprint Border 11D System Called Inadequate,
WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2004, at A8 (explaining that current fingerprint system for
entry is problematic).
72. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 41.121 (2004) (stating that refusal must be based on
"legal grounds"); id. § 41.122 (providing example of U.S. government's effort to
restrict travel); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2004) (setting forth legal grounds for inad-
15
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sound obvious, but practice suggests otherwise. For instance, only after
efforts to combat public corruption received attention throughout the
hemisphere did governments consider taking actions to deny or revoke
visas of corrupt public officials and their immediate families. 73 Fugitives
charged with serious violent offenses are not even subject to this restric-
tion.74 A country's failure to provide a legal basis to deny or revoke visas
missibility including criminal convictions); Visa Revocation: Catching the Terrorists
Among Us: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Security, Emerging Threats and Int'l
Relations of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform, 108th Cong. 34-38 (2003) (statement of
Catherine Barry, Managing Director, Office of Visa Services, Bureau of Consular
Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State) (underscoring how visa revocation serves as law en-
forcement tool, particularly in terrorism context), available at http://frweb-
gate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house-hearings&docid=f.91
049.pdf.
Of course, combating impunity may mean issuing a visa or leaving a visa in
force, but that remains a unilateral decision of the issuing government where
rights of the asylum state are not implicated. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 710 (1893) (affirming that immigration actions are sovereign and
unilateral); McMullen v. INS, 788 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1986) (same). It can also
be a cooperative decision of governments that appreciate the particular concerns
of a specific case. See Laflin, supra note 67, at 326-29 (discussing informal coopera-
tive efforts between states). Cooperation, in this instance, is grounded on the gov-
ernments' collaborative desire to ensure that justice is achieved. See id. at 326
(same). Though the practice is questioned, preserving the executive's prerogative
is important to ensure that all appropriate tools to combat impunity can be used.
Editorial, A Visa Revoked, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2004, at A22 (questioning U.S. ac-
tions to revoke visa of prominent scholar).
73. See Presidential Proclamation No. 7750, 69 Fed. Reg. 2287 (Jan. 12, 2004)
(suspending entry of immigrants or non-immigrants engaged in or benefiting
from corruption), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/
01/20040112-3.html; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2004) (permitting President to
declare inadmissible particular classes of individuals whose unrestricted entry
would be detrimental to interests of United States).
74. Those on terrorist watch lists are certainly subject to denial and revoca-
tion. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a) (3) (B), (F) (2004) (defining terrorist activities); see
also Progress in Consolidating Terrorist Watchlists-The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC),
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Intelligence and Counterterrorism of the
Select Comm. on Homeland Security, 108th Cong. 8-13 (2004) (Statement of Donna A.
Bucella, Director, Terrorist Screening Center, FBI) (discussing role of Terrorist
Screening Center in visa revocation process), available at http://www.fbi.gov/con-
gress/congress04/bucella071304.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
Those who are sought to stand trial, even for violent offenses, are not inadmis-
sible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (2) (A) (i) (requiring criminal conviction, admission of
commission or admission of acts constituting essential elements of "crime involv-
ing moral turpitude" or drug offense to deny visa); see also id. § 1182(a) (2) (B)
(providing visa denial for those convicted of two or more non-political offenses for
which aggregate sentences were five or more years).
Convictions are not required and, therefore, visas can be denied for those
associated with drug trafficking; those associated with prostitution; serious felons
who asserted immunity from prosecution; public officials who violate religious
freedoms; persons associated with trafficking in persons; money launderers; those
whose presence could adversely impact U.S. foreign policy; members of totalitarian
political parties; participants in Nazi persecutions or genocide; public charges;
those without labor certifications; unlawful entrants; those with invalid entry docu-
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or to deny visas to convicts but not to those facing prosecution for serious,
ordinary, non-political crimes, promotes impunity.75 Adopting or amend-
ing legislation to address this issue would enable states-on an administra-
tive basis-to deny fugitives safe haven and combat impunity more
directly.
76
As a practical matter, executive authorities of a requesting country
may have to work directly with their counterparts in the requested country
to deny or revoke a visa.77 In the best case scenario, the administrative
action can lead to the individual's apprehension (and return). Alterna-
tively, the action limits the fugitive's geographic mobility and demon-
strates a cooperative basis to combat impunity frontally. 78 If necessary, the
requesting country may solicit appropriate ancillary measures, such as sur-
veillance, to mitigate further risks of flight.
79
ments; those ineligible for citizenship, those previously removed; practicing
polygamists; guardians of inadmissible helpless alien; child abductors; those who
voted unlawfully; and former citizens who renounced U.S. citizenship to avoid pay-
ing taxes. See id. § 1182 (naming inadmissible aliens). Expanding the list to in-
clude those subject to criminal prosecution for serious, non-political offenses, such
as murder, rape and kidnapping, makes sense. Proposed legislation could even
link the denial to the existence of an outstanding Interpol Red Notice. See
Warner, supra note 4, at 174 (highlighting Interpol's role in extradition context).
For example, an outstanding arrest warrant can serve as a basis to exclude foreign
nationals in Mexico. See id. at 173 n.15 (providing Mexico's General Population
Law as example). For further discussion of Interpol, see supra note 14.
75. For further discussion of the duty of states, see supra note 66 and accom-
panying text (underscoring states' obligation to take action to combat impunity).
76. Governments will undoubtedly expose themselves to criticism, but such
sovereign acts remain a matter solely between the government and the alien. See
Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 711; McMullen, 788 F.2d at 596; see also Interpol, Extradi-
tion-Some Benchmarks (distinguishing extradition from deportation), at http://
www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/ LegalMaterials/FactSheets/ FSIl.asp (last up-
dated Mar. 18, 2003).
77. See Laflin, supra note 67, at 326 (noting that cooperative alternatives "in-
vok[e] no or little international opprobrium or state sponsored retaliation later on
since both states were involved in the operation").
78. At the same time, governments might coordinate a request for provisional
arrest or extradition. For further discussion of provisional arrests, see supra note
28. See also Enache-Brown & Fried, supra note 66, at 632-33 (concluding that state
actions to cooperate do not impinge on state's sovereignty). For further discussion
of Interpol's role in extradition, see supra note 74.
79. The USMS, for instance, is equipped to assist foreign governments seek-
ing to confirm the location of fugitives in the United States. See USMS, supra note
10 (noting availability to assist foreign law enforcement requests); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.3(d) (2004) (permitting BICE to detain certain individuals for up to forty-
eight hours when deciding whether individual is clearly and beyond doubt entitled
to be admitted); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2) (A) (2004) (setting forth "clearly and be-
yond a doubt" standard). Expanding the detention period for those seeking ad-
mission subject to an Interpol Red Notice could afford requesting and requested
states sufficient time to coordinate apprehension and return efforts.
17
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Denying the issuance of or revoking a fugitive's passport also limits
geographic mobility.8 0 Passport revocation is not a practice embraced by
many countries. Some countries disfavor the practice, claiming that doing
so infringes on a fugitive's fundamental right to identity and nationality
because a passport is inseparably linked to identity and nationality.8 1 Ac-
cepting the passport as a travel document and understanding that the con-
cepts of identity/nationality and mobility are severable can provide the
appropriate basis to promote legal initiatives to help combat transnational
crime. 82 Preserving this premise in a statute would then ensure, in prac-
tice, that Egyptian national fugitives who enter an Egyptian consulate in
Morocco to solicit particular services, for instance, could also find them-
selves returning to Egypt to face justice. 83
Absent this mechanism, officials must often look to deportation, ex-
pulsion or another immigration basis for removing the fugitive, generally,
to the fugitive's home country to face trial, be sentenced or serve a sen-
tence. 84 The immigration act, an act of a sovereign state, is often
grounded in the requesting country's disclosure of a charging document
and concomitant order for arrest.85 As a general rule, removal under im-
80. See 22 C.F.R. § 51.70-76 (2004) (providing legal foundations for U.S. law).
Similar to the executive decision to issue a visa or leave a visa in force, a govern-
ment could choose to issue a passport, leave a passport in force or provide a travel
letter to facilitate a fugitive's apprehension and return. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 7
FOREIGN ArrAIRs MANUAL § 1625.2 (2005) (explaining role of consular services at
U.S. Embassy in facilitating fugitive's return to United States), available at http://
foia.state.gov/masterdocs/07fam/07ml 620.pdf.
81. SeeWarner, supra note 4, at 172 n.12 (noting that if other countries imple-
ment similar normative rules outside United States, it could assist in bilateral ef-
forts to locate and apprehend fugitives).
82. Unlike the right to domestic interstate travel, the U.S. Constitution allows
the right to international travel to be regulated. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280,
307 (1981) (stating that right to international travel can be regulated within
bounds of due process); see also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958) (dis-
cussing right to international travel). Those fleeing justice should not be able to
cloak themselves in this qualified right when their aim is to evade justice and seek
safe haven.
83. See, e.g., Anthony Faiola, Chess Champ Fischer Maneuvers to Avoid Extradition,
WASH. PosT, July 30, 2004, at All (providing example of U.S. citizen and fugitive
who sought consular assistance abroad and found himself subject to U.S. request
for his return to face charges in United States).
84. See U.S. ATToRNEY's MANuAL [hereinafter USAM] §§ 9-15.600-.650 (1997)
(identifying alternatives to extradition such as immigration removals and lures),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia-reading-room/usam/title9/
15mcrm.htm#9-15.000; see also Snow, supra note 28, at 228-31 (introducing alterna-
tives among available resources to apprehend and return fugitives).
85. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1893) (affirming
principle that immigration acts are sovereign and unilateral); McMullen v. INS,
788 F.2d 591, 596 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming principle that immigration removal is
sovereign act); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981) ("Nothing
in [an extradition] treaty prevents a sovereign nation from deporting foreign na-
tionals for other reasons and in other ways should it wish to do so.").
Federal case law provides multiple examples. See, e.g., United States v. Chapa-
Garza, 62 F.3d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1995) (discussing Mexican authorities who de-
(Vol. 50: p. 479
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migration laws is generally expeditious and affords the requesting state a
great degree of leverage to ensure that the fullest extent of the law can be
applied, when necessary.8 6 At the same time, immigration proceedings
may require premature exposure of the requesting state's case if the fugi-
tive is sought to stand trial.
8 7
Removal through the immigration process cannot apply against na-
tionals of the requested state,88 nor as a matter of practice will a requested
ported defendant on mistake of U.S. citizenship); United States v. Pomeroy, 822
F.2d 718, 720 (8th Cir. 1987) (recounting that Canada deported defendant); Cor-
dero, 668 F.2d at 38 (presenting Panamanian and Venezuelan officials who re-
moved respective defendants); United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir.
1980) (illustrating how Thai officials removed U.S. fugitive incarcerated for viola-
tion of Thai law); United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 270 (7th Cir. 1976)
(presenting Cayman official, aware of FBI interest in defendant, who gave defen-
dant choice to depart Islands voluntarily or face detention for violation of local
law); United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir. 1975) (recounting that
Mexico expelled defendant); United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 746 (9th Cir.
1973) (noting that Vietnam removed U.S. fugitives incarcerated on local charges);
United States v. Caramian, 468 F.2d 1370, 1371 (5th Cir. 1972) (describing expe-
dited removal from Bolivia); United States v. Hamilton, 460 F.2d 1270, 1270 (9th
Cir. 1972) (describing how Canadian officials delivered defendant to border);
Charron v. United States, 412 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir. 1969) (explaining that Mex-
ico denied entry to defendant and placed him on next flight to United States);
Stevenson v. United States, 381 F.2d 142, 143 (9th Cir. 1967) (recounting how
Mexican state officials delivered defendant to border); United States v. Evans, 667
F. Supp. 974, 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that Bermudan authorities deported
defendants); United States v. Wilson, 565 F. Supp. 1416, 1422 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (ex-
plaining how Dominican officials removed defendant); United States v. Orsini, 424
F. Supp. 229, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (detailing how defendant was expelled from
Senegal); see also INCSR, supra note 21 (reporting that Mexico deported more than
seventy fugitives to United States during 2003).
86. Specialty (or speciality) does not apply. See 18 U.S.C. § 3192 (2004) (codi-
fying principle by affording extraditee appropriate protections through trial and
incarceration "and for a reasonable time thereafter"); see also United States v. Rau-
scher, 119 U.S. 407, 422-23 (1886) (implicitly acknowledging rule of specialty).
The principle has since developed through case law. See Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S.
127, 132-33 (1916) (affirming principle); Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 527, 542-
43, 545 (1893) (discussing Rauscher); United States v. Naylin, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422
(9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (conditioning challenges on what offended state
could have raised); United States v. Martonak, 187 F. Supp. 2d 117, 122 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (finding private right to raise specialty); United States v.Jurado-Rodriguez,
907 F. Supp. 568, 576 (E.D.N.Y 1995) (conditioning challenges).
87. A criticism of this approach is that it lacks process similar to that afforded
in extradition proceedings. Premature disclosure can compromise an on-going
investigation or alert other interested persons of the government's action. Seeking
return through immigration process can reduce or eliminate these risks.
88. Countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa have constitu-
tional provisions in this regard. See BAHR. CONST. art. 17(b) ("It is prohibited to
banish a citizen from Bahrain or prevent him from returning to it."), available at
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ba00000_.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005);
EG.YrP CoNST., supra note 26, art. 51 ("No citizen may be deported from the coun-
try or prevented from returning to it."); IRAQ INTERIM CONST., supra note 34, art.
11 (b) ("No Iraqi may have his Iraqi citizenship withdrawn or be exiled unless he is
a naturalized citizen who, in his application for citizenship, as established in a
court of law, made material falsifications on the basis of which citizenship was
497
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state initiate this process against an individual who actually or potentially
has a claim of the requested state's nationality.89 Challenges, however, are
common, especially among white collar fugitives, and, therefore, hearings
are often protracted over periods of years.90 In the end, the fugitive's re-
turn is generally a foregone conclusion-more a question of when-but
the time earned challenging the immigration process has shown that some
fugitives can return to their home country uncuffed and, as a result of
legal maneuverings in the requesting country, with a court order in hand
to guarantee release.
91
In these scenarios, the requesting state is taking action so that the
accused can stand trial or convicted can be sentenced or serve a sentence.
granted."); JoRDAN CONST., supra note 43, art. 9(i) ("No Jordanian may be de-
ported from the territory of the Kingdom."); KUWAIT CONST. art. 28 ("No Kuwaiti
may be deported from Kuwait or prevented from returning thereto."), available at
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/kuOOOOO._html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005);
OMAN CONST. art. 16 ("It is not permitted to deport or exile citizens, or prevent
them from returning to the Sultanate."), available at http://www.omanet.om/en-
glish/government/ basiclaw/law/asp?cat=gov/subcat-blaw (last visited Jan. 26,
2005); QATAR CONST. art. 38 ("No citizen shall be banished neither shall he be
denied re-entry to his country."), available at http://www.qatarembassy.net/consti-
tution.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2005); SYIuA CONsT. art. 33(i) ("No citizen can be
expatriated or prevented from returning to his country."), available at http://
www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/ icl/sy00000.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005); see also
Nancy J. Brown, The Third Draft Constitution for a Palestinian State: Translation and
Commentary, Palestinian Ctr. for Policy & Survey Research 17 (Oct. 2003) (quoting
Article 31: "Likewise a Palestinian may not be deported or prevented from re-
turning to his country."), at http://www.pcpsr.org/domestic/2003/nbrowne.pdf.
According to press accounts, U.S. officials negotiated with Yaser Hamdi, a U.S.
born citizen who had been held as an enemy combatant, to revoke his U.S. citizen-
ship and return him to Saudi Arabia, his alternative country of nationality. See
Jerry Markon, Father Denounces Hamdi's Imprisonment, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2004, at
A4 (restating comments made by Hamdi's father). Moreover, other naturalized
citizen defendants in the United States have entered into plea agreements that
include renunciation of U.S. citizenship and acceptance of a concomitant order
for removal through immigration process at the discretion of the U.S. government.
SeeJerry Markon, Muslim Activist Sentenced to 23 Years for Libya Contacts, WASH. POST,
Oct. 16, 2004, at A17 (reporting that defendant automatically lost U.S. citizenship
as part of plea agreement). Those naturalized citizens who are convicted also face
immigration removal. See Jerry Markon, Man Guilty in Case of Terror Ties, WASH.
POST, Oct. 13, 2004, at A4 (providing example).
89. A review of nationality law of the respective countries is outside the pur-
view of this Article, though as a practical matter most countries in the region in-
clude the principle of ins sanguis in their nationality law. See, e.g., CODE DE LA
NATIONALrr MAROCAINE [MoRoccAN NATIONALITY CODE] art. 6 (providing that
Moroccan women cannot give their nationality to their husbands), available at
http://www.mincom.gov.ma/french/generalites/ orga.eta/statut.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2005).
90. See Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Extradites PEMEX's Former Director to Mexico on Electo-
ral Fraud Charges, 20 INT'L ENFORCEMENT LAW RvrI. 455, 455-56 (2004) (reporting
that process to return much sought after Mexican white-collar fugitive from
United States took more than two years).
91. See id. (stating that creative lawyering "ensured that [Rogelio
Montemayor] would be subject to home detention rather than jail" after he re-
turned to Mexico).
[Vol. 50: p. 479
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Viewed through eyes of the victim or harmed community or through the
lens of pragmatism, many interests can be accommodated-including pre-
serving public coffers and promoting judicial economy-if these fugitives
would voluntarily return to the requesting country. 92 While challenging
proceedings conforms with the laws of the requested state and interna-
tional law and practice-and affords the fugitive all the protections under
the laws of the requested country-all too often the conclusion is the
same: The fugitive returns to the requesting country to face justice. 93 Le-
gal maneuvers, particularly in high profile cases, do little to serve the pub-
lic at large and, depending on the degree of publicity, can adversely
impact the integrity of the court.
94
The requesting state may defer to or rely on the requested state's do-
mestic judicial process to ensure that justice is served.9 5 Deferring to an-
other state's domestic process often arises in the context of extraterritorial
92. It is plausible that a fugitive may want to waive process and return to re-
questing jurisdiction to stand trial. Prosecutors may afford the fugitive a benefit
for making that decision and otherwise cooperating. See United States v. Diacolios,
837 F.2d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that defendant expressed willingness to
voluntarily return). But see Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Efforts to Extradite Persons for Tax
Offenses, 25 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 653, 677 (2003) (claiming government
neglected to disclose potential capital sentence so defendant could make informed
decision). Or the individual may also conclude that voluntarily returning serves
other interests. See Miguel Angel Rodriguez, Carta al presidente del Consejo
Permanente de la Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos, Aristides Royo, EL TIEMPO LA-
TINO, Oct. 15, 2004, at A6 (noting costs to family and intergovernmental organiza-
tion persuaded organization's leader to resign and face corruption investigation in
home country).
In those cases, the United States may "parole" the fugitive into the United
States to stand trial when the fugitive lacks alternative legal basis to enter. See 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d) (2004). In the immigration context, parole permits the individ-
ual to physically enter the United States, though for other legal purposes is not
considered legally present. See id.
93. For further discussion of the U.S. extradition of Rogelio Montemayor, a
major Mexican white-collar fugitive, see supra note 91. See also Zagaris, supra note
90, at 456 (suggesting that maneuverings are appropriate because fugitive re-
turned with protections of specialty and without prospects of immediate
detention).
94. Fugitives, on occasion, have publicly espoused the integrity of the request-
ing state's judicial system-often their home country's-yet insist on challenging
their return, perhaps even preemptively exposing themselves to a requested state's
judicial system. For further discussion of Oscar Espinosa Villareal and Carlos Ca-
bal Peniche as two examples, see supra note 70; see also Zagaris, supra note 90, at
456 (discussing Rogelio Montemayor as another example).
95. Deference may be express or tacit. Directly transferring prosecution to
the asylum state would be express. Domestic prosecution pursuant to an asylum's
decision not to extradite on the basis of nationality is another example. See U.S.-
Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 22, art. 9. Tacit deference may be the asy-
lum state taking action based on a victim seeking recourse in the asylum state with
or without the assistance of the officials who otherwise would have authority in the
jurisdiction where the crime occurred. State of Texas, Criminal Prosecutions Under
Article 4 of the Mexican Federal Penal Code (March 2000), chs. I & II (illustrating
example of victim seeking recourse with assistance of state officials), available at
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/AG_-Publications/txts/article4_manual.htm#chapl.
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jurisdiction. 96 Unlike the United States, many countries in the Middle
East and North Africa permit domestic prosecution for crimes committed
abroad by their nationals or against their nationals. 97 In practice, this
means that a criminal of Algerian nationality or a criminal who victimized
an Algerian national should not be able to seek refuge in Algeria.98 In the
absence of extraterritorial jurisdiction, a country like the United States has
to rely on the asylum state's laws to ensure thatjustice is served.99 So, if an
American were to commit an ordinary crime abroad, the United States
would have to rely on the jurisdiction in which the offense occurred to
bring that individual to justice. 10 0
In the rare instance when the crime involved is particularly egregious
and when a requested state is unwilling or unable to cooperate to return
or prosecute a fugitive, the requesting state may have to consider unilat-
eral actions, such as lures or other extraordinary measures, to bring a fugi-
tive tojusticei 0 ' The U.S. Department ofJustice says that a "lure involves
96. See Snow, supra note 28, at 230 (drawing attention to principle of national-
ity as basis for countries to prosecute domestically crimes committed abroad by or
against their nationals).
97. See ALGERIAN CODE OF CRIMINAL' PROCEDURE, supra note 47, arts. 582-89
(providing extraterritorial jurisdiction in Algeria for criminal acts committed
outside Algeria by Algerians or against Algerian nationals); MOROCCAN EXTRADI-
TION LAw, supra note 47, arts. 748-56 (establishing jurisdiction when perpetrator is
Moroccan or victim is Moroccan national); TUNISIAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE, supra note 47, arts. 305-307 (accepting jurisdiction over crimes committed
outside Tunisia by Tunisians or against Tunisian nationals).
98. For further discussion of the issue of nationality in context of extradition
and merits for trying individuals in jurisdiction where crime was committed, see
infra notes 114-16. See also William Branigin, 2 Sentenced to Die for USS Cole Attack,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2004, at A18 (reporting that Yemeni court sentenced Abd
Rahim Nashiri and Jamal Badawi to death and four others to incarceration for
their roles in suicide bombing of USS Cole in October 2000); Ajazeera.net, Yemenis
to Die for USS Cole Blast (Sept. 29, 2004) (reporting sentences for individuals con-
victed of bombing USS Cole), at http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/
BD47BCAE-6431-4F38-AO7B-7B6CFE54DFCB.htm.
99. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2004) (granting U.S. jurisdiction for certain
murders committed abroad); id. § 2332a (granting U.S. jurisdiction for crimes
concerning weapons of mass destruction); id. § 2332b (granting U.S. jurisdiction
for transnational terrorist acts); id. § 2332f (granting U.S. jurisdiction for certain
bombings).
100. The recent Omani case of the American woman convicted for having her
husband killed illustrates this point. See BBC News World Ed., US Woman Faces
Execution in Oman (July 17, 2004) (reporting capital sentence), at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ middle east/3903289.stm. An Omani court convicted Re-
becca Thompson, along with her son, for hiring Omani nationals to kill her hus-
band. See id. (noting that Thompson's son received three-year sentence and would
be deported). Had Oman taken no action against her or acquitted her for the
acts, U.S. law probably would have offered no basis to bring her to justice.
101. The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed that the method by which a defen-
dant appears before the court does not bar the court from exercising jurisdiction
over that defendant. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1951) (declining to
overturn holding that jurisdiction is not impaired by forcible abduction); Ker v.
Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886) (holding that mere irregularities of how defen-
[Vol. 50: p. 479
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using a subterfuge to entice a criminal defendant to leave a foreign coun-
try so that he or she can be arrested in the United States, in international
waters or airspace, or in a third country for subsequent extradition, expul-
sion, or deportation to the United States."10 2 The lure scenario may be as
simple as initiating a telephone call, sending an e-mail or transmitting a
page.' 0 3 Or it could be as complex as drawing someone into international
waters, where the individual is confronted by U.S. officials, U.S. vessels and
a one-way ticket to the United States. 10 4 Luring may include non-disclo-
sure to the country of the individual's nationality or target country (if not
the United States), but the presumption of non-disclosure is grounded in
supposition, not practice. 105 While the United States considers a lure to
be a legitimate law enforcement tool, other countries may not.10 6 Conse-
quently, a destination country may refuse to extradite a lured fugitive.
10 7
Needless to say, the use of lures should remain selective, limited and
controlled. 108
The case of Humberto Alvarez Machain, the Mexican doctor who U.S.
officials claimed prolonged the life of DEA Agent Enrique "Kiki"
Camarena Salazar to subject him to additional torture before his assailants
executed him, is an example of a government's decision to resort to ex-
traordinary measures to bring a fugitive to justice at the hands of state
agents, agents acting on behalf of the removing state or other private
dant was brought into custody do not relieve court of jurisdiction); see also USAM,
supra note 84, at § 9-15.630 (establishing protocols within U.S. Department of Jus-
tice for those prosecutors considering lures and extraordinary actions to appre-
hend fugitives). But see United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 270 (2d Cir.
1974) (crafting sole exception to general rule when fugitive abducted from
Uruguay).
102. USAM, supra note 84, § 9-15.630; see also Snow, supra 28, at 229 (identify-
ing lures as "legitimate, increasingly important law enforcement technique").
103. See Snow, supra note 28, at 230 (stating that activity may consist of "noth-
ing more than telephone calls or e-mails into the country").
104. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 891, 895-96 (D.C. Cir. 1988), affd,
924 F.2d 1086, 1092-93 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (providing example of luring into interna-
tional waters); United States v. Wilson, 721 F.2d 967, 971-72 (4th Cir. 1983) (stat-
ing facts of how United States lured defendant to Dominican Republic where U.S.
agents met him after Dominican officials denied his entry); United States ex rel
Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1975) (illustrating how United States
lured defendant to Bolivia where defendant was then abducted and flown to
United States).
105. See Laflin, supra note 67, at 315, 320, 323 (asserting U.S. "policy of non-
extradition" and suggesting that U.S. government renders irregularly in ordinary
rather than "extreme cases" and without "guidelines").
106. See also Snow, supra note 28, at 230 (noting that "lures can even be pro-
hibited by foreign criminal law").
107. See USAM, supra note 84, § 9-15.610 (acknowledging potential interna-
tional repercussion related to lure).
108. Cf Laflin, supra note 67, at 323 (suggesting U.S. Department of Justice
lacks internal process to decide whether to approve such action and promoting
action "by the Attorney General after consultation with other administration
officials").
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agents, such as bounty hunters.' 0 9 Critics tend to use the case to illustrate,
as if routine, measures the U.S. government employs to apprehend and
return fugitives. A review of federal case law shows that the United States'
use of such measures is exceptional1 1 and that, when employed, asylum
states have generally permitted, participated in or not protested the mea-
sure.'' Obvious international repercussion for resorting to such mea-
sures means that cases, such as Alvarez Machain, should remain
109. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992) (summa-
rizing basic facts); see also USAM, supra note 84, § 9-15.610 (describing probable
actors); 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 163, 163-64 (1989) (concluding that FBI can
investigate and arrest abroad irrespective of prevailing international norms); Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2747 (2004) (declining to decide whether DEA
arrest authority under 21 U.S.C. § 878 can be exercised extraterritorially).
110. The review focuses on federal cases. For examples of extraordinary mea-
sures, see supra note 104; see also United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1126 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (providing example of forcible removal); Matta-Ballesteros v. Hehman,
896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 208 (3d
Cir. 1975) (same); United States ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir.
1975) (same); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 891, 895-96 (D.D.C. 1988)
(same), aff'd, 924 F.2d 1086, 1092-93 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Unverzagt,
299 F. 1015, 1016 (W.D. Wash. 1924) (same)
111. See, e.g., Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 438 (1886) (illustrating how defen-
dant was kidnapped from Peru); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 89 (2d Cir.
2003) (providing example of seizure of defendant in Pakistan); Kasi v. Angelone,
300 F.3d 487, 491 (4th Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Torres-Gonzalez, 240
F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 2001) (describing how defendant was seized from Venezuela);
Rezaq, 134 F.3d at 1126 (explaining facts involving defendant's release from Malta
prison into hands of U.S. authorities); United States v. Matta, 937 F.2d 567, 567
(l1th Cir. 1991) (stating how U.S. agents seized defendant from Honduras);
Matta-Ballesteros, 896 F.2d at 256 (same); United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d 994,
1006-09 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining how United States kidnapped defendant from
Mexico); United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221, 1229 (5th Cir. 1988) (describing
how Panamian authorities released defendants to United States); United States v.
Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating facts regarding kidnapping
in Guatemala); United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 32 (1st Cir. 1981) (discuss-
ing defendant's transport from Panama to Venezuela and then to Puerto Rico);
United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 899 (2d Cir. 1981) (illustrating defendant's
abduction from Bahamas); United States v. Lara, 539 F.2d 495, 495 (5th Cir. 1976)
(explaining defendant's abduction from Panama); United States v. Lovato, 520
F.2d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating facts regarding defendant's kidnapping
from Mexico); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1975) (describing
how defendant was forced out of Chile into U.S. hands); United States v. Quesada,
512 F.2d 1043, 1044 (5th Cir. 1975) (illustrating how defendant was forced out of
Venezuela); Lujan, 510 F.2d at 63 (discussing how defendant was seized from Bo-
livia); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974) (demonstrating
defendant's abduction from Peru); United States v. Vicars, 467 F.2d 452, 455 (5th
Cir. 1972) (discussing defendant's alleged illegal arrest from Panama Canal Zone);
United States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520, 521 (2d Cir. 1957) (same); Chandler v.
United States, 171 F.2d 921, 935 (1st Cir. 1948) (discussing defendant's apprehen-
sion in Germany and return to United States); United States v. Noriega, 746 F.
Supp. 1506, 1529-30 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (describing how defendant was kidnapped
from Panama); Ex parte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342, 344 (S.D. Tex. 1934) (explaining
how defendant was arrested from Mexico); United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp 310,
313 (N.D. Il. 1934) (stating facts of defendant's arrest from Turkey); Ex parte
Campbell, 1 F. Supp. 899, 899 (S.D Tex. 1932) (describing defendant's abduction
24
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exceptional. If circumstances justify a requesting state's resorting to ex-
traordinary measures, 112 then their scope should be controlled and pro-
portionate to the crime for which removal is sought.
1 13
V. CONSIDERATIONS
Effective bilateral law enforcement relationships between the United
States and other countries in the region are an obvious and worthwhile
goal. While existing bilateral extradition treaties offer a point of depar-
ture for fostering these kinds of relationships, negotiating further treaties
can play an important role in promoting engagement and fostering collab-
orative actions to combat transnational crimes, especially terrorism, terror-
ist financing and narco-terrorism.
Should the United States and governments in the region choose to
engage and begin extradition treaty negotiations, the issue of nationals
from Mexico); Unverzagt, 299 F. at 1016 (illustrating how United States obtained
defendant from Canada).
112. See Laflin, supra note 67, at 323 (noting that failure to surrender or to
prosecute breaches asylum state's duty of "due diligence," violation of customary
international law, and therefore becomes complicit in underlying act); see also
Kelly, supra note 67, at 521 (explaining that governments' conflicting interests can
enable criminals to "play the system" and make "mockery of the law").
113. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 657 n.2 (reporting that negotiations to
negotiate Alvarez-Machain's return were unsuccessful); Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2746
(stating that "DEA asked the Mexican Government for help in getting Alvarez into
the United States" and that "the requests and negotiations proved fruitless").
For a review of federal case law, see supra notes 109, 111. It supports the
notion that extraordinary measures-especially those that are truly unilateral-by
the United States are infrequent. Of those cases, Mexico protested forcible remov-
als on three occasions. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 670 (concluding "that re-
spondent's abduction was not in violation of the Extradition Treaty between the
United States and Mexico"); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341,
1343 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that United States did not illegally seize Mexican
national from Mexico); Lopez, 6 F. Supp. at 344 (noting that U.S. officials forcibly
removed U.S. citizen who was granted asylum in Mexico). Mexico did not protest
forcible removals on other occasions. See, e.g., Kaufman, 858 F.2d at 1006-09 (dis-
cussing how DEA agents arrested defendants in Mexico and Mexican officials par-
ticipated in removal via commercial carrier); Sobel, 244 F.2d at 521 (noting that
Mexican Security Police seized defendant in Mexico City and transported him to
Laredo Port of Entry); Campbell, I F. Supp. at 899 (stating that Mexican and U.S.
officials participated in forcible removal of defendant).
Surprisingly, some fugitives have gone so far as to argue that due diligence in
apprehending transnational fugitives includes abduction. See United States v.
Blanco, 861 F.2d 773, 778-79 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that defendant contended
that "government should have tried to either lure her from Colombia or seize her
there"); United States v. McGeough, No. CR-82-00327-11 (CPS), 1992 WL 390234,
at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 1992) (discussing defendant's argument that United States
"should have sent its agents abroad to kidnap the defendant"). Both courts re-
jected the defendants' argument. See Blanco, 861 F.2d at 777 (rejecting defen-
dant's argument that government violated her right to speedy trial); McGeough,
1992 WL 390234, at *6 (rejecting defendant's argument of prejudice).
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will likely play a determinative role.' 14 Neither the U.S. Constitution nor
U.S. law prohibits the extradition of U.S. nationals, 1 5 giving support to
the U.S. position that the duty of non-asylum, or denying safe haven, in-
cludes the notion that fugitives should be prosecuted in the jurisdiction
where they committed the crime. 116 Two countries in the region, how-
ever, have constitutional provisions that expressly forbid the extradition of
their nationals, 117 and other countries have domestic legal provisions that
prohibit the extradition of nationals. 118 The U.S.-Jordan Extradition
Treaty, however, illustrates one approach for resolving this issue, and
negotiators can use this treaty as an example to explore alternatives to
address the nationality issue. 1 1
9
Probable sentences facing prospective extraditees could also impact
treaty negotiations. 120 While a prospective capital sentence is generally
114. According to one commentator, "U.S. Department of Justice officials
routinely urge foreign officials to change the laws or policies which prevent them
from extraditing their nationals." Snow, supra note 28, at 216 n.22. Snow refers to
a State Department report, which asserts that "[t]he United States makes no dis-
tinction between extraditing its own nationals and nationals of other countries.
We advocate that all countries adopt the same policy." Id. (citation omitted).
115. See 18 U.S.C. § 3196 (2004) (providing that United States can extradite
national even if provision not included in extradition treaty).
116. The concerns of the victims and community are squarely confronted
when an individual is prosecuted in the jurisdiction where the crime was commit-
ted. See Enache-Brown & Fried, supra note 66, at 613, 632-33. (noting that extradit-
ing criminals to requesting states imposes only minimal burden on host country).
Moreover, witnesses and other evidence are within that jurisdiction. See Laftin,
supra note 67, at 333 (explaining that evidence is more often found in jurisdiction
where crime took place).
117. See U.A.E. CONST. art. 38 ("The extradition of citizens and of political
refugees shall be prohibited."); YEMEN CONST. art. 44 ("A Yemeni national may not
be extradited to a foreign authority."), available at http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/
gov/con94.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005); see also PALESTINIAN CONST. art. 31 ("No
Palestinian may be extradited to a foreign state.").
118. See ALGERIAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 47, arts. 696, 698
(prohibiting extradition of Algeria nationals based on nationality at time crime
occurred); MOROCCAN EXTRADITION LAw, supra note 47, arts. 3, 5 (barring extradi-
tion of Moroccan nationals based on nationality at time individual committed
crime); TUNISIAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 47, art. 312 (prohibit-
ing extradition of Tunisians based on nationality at time decision to extradite is
made).
119. See U.S.-Jordan Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, art. 3 (stating that na-
tionality cannot bar extradition if all other conditions to grant extradition are
met). Obvious factors will play key roles in whatever effort the U.S. government
takes to promote this principle in any future treaty negotiated within the region.
Legal factors include constitutional norms and domestic procedures to promote
internal normative changes. Policy factors include geopolitical events within and
outside the region, particularly the U.S. relationship with Israel. Cf Agreement
Between the Arab League States Concerning the Extradition of Fugitive Offenders,
Nov. 3, 1952, reprinted in 159 BRIT. AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 606, 606-12 (1961)
(obliging parties to surrender nationals of requesting state but not requested state
under specific circumstances).
120. Other countries, particularly Mexico, have recently expressed concerns
about prospective sentences extraditees might face in the United States. The ex-
[Vol. 50: p. 479
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not a bar to extraditing an individual from the United States, how the
capital sentence might be carried out in the requesting country could
raise concerns for an extraditee from the United States.1 2 1 Similarly,
countries in the region might impose a capital sentence for a crime that
carries a maximum term of years in the United States. Or the prospective
term of years may be more significant than the prison sentence the indi-
vidual might have faced for committing the same crime in the United
States. With an emphasis on combating terrorism and terrorism-related
crimes, questions concerning prospective sentences are unavoidable and
should be addressed in treaty negotiations.
122
Advice and consent before the U.S. Senate will surely draw attention
to the kind of procedures a prospective extraditee to the requested coun-
try might face. 123 Legislators will question whether the prospective treaty
tradition treaty between the United States and Mexico acknowledges that the re-
quested State can deny a request for extradition absent an assurance that a capital
sentence would not be imposed or, if imposed, not be executed. See U.S.-Mexico
Extradition Treaty, supra note 22, art. 8. Even so, since October 2001, Mexico has
been soliciting similar assurances for prospective life sentences. See U.S. Dep't of
State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Mar. 2005), available at http://
www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/voll/html/42364.htm. The Mexican gov-
ernment has grounded its requests for assurances on a Mexican Supreme Court
decision that was issued the same month that the court interpreted life sentences
to be a form of cruel and unusual punishment under Article 22 of the Mexican
Constitution, a position the Mexican Supreme Court recently affirmed in April
2004. See id.
121. The U.S. government does not report whether an extradition to another
country has been denied based on the prospective sentence a fugitive might face
in the requested country.
122. The U.S.-Jordan Extradition Treaty recognizes this issue, with respect to
a capital sentence, not disparate terms of years. Prospective treaties will likely treat
the issue of sentencing similarly. See U.S.-Jordan Extradition Treaty, supra note 20,
art. 7 (permitting requested country to seek assurances that capital sentence will
not be sought or, if imposed, not be carried out).
In this context, discussion may also focus on the prospective treaty partners'
use of shariah law and human rights practices. Shariah law, or the religious law of
Islam, is a fundamental source of law in the Middle East and North Africa. Offense
and punishment under shariah law may differ from those in the United States. See
Aljazeera.net, Scholars Condemn US Sharia Threat (Feb. 21, 2004), at http://en-
glish.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres /9CBB1903-FF67-482A-B756-78970EDD 1173.htm;
Ruqaiyah Waris Maqsood, Shariah: A Practical Guide (Apr. 11, 2005) (explaining
basic notions of shariah), at http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/be-
liefs/sharia/ practical.shtml#start.
The U.S. Department of State regularly publishes reviews of human rights
practices of various countries. See 2003 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE HUMAN RIGHTS REP.
(Mar. 2004) (detailing human rights violations), available at http://www.state.gov/
g/drl/rls /hrrpt/2003/index.htm. A review of criminal process and the applica-
tion of shariah law is often contained in them. See id. (presenting criminal proce-
dures of countries suspected of being human rights violators).
123. See Campbell v. Wood, 511 U.S. 1119, 1119 (1994) (Blackmun,J., dissent-
ing) (condemning decapitation in conjunction with hanging); see also President
George W. Bush, President Bush Condemns Brutal Execution of Nicholas Berg
(May 12, 2004) (expressing condolences relating to death of innocent civilian in
505
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partner provides for such fundamental protections, such as the presump-
tion of innocence, cross-examination and appellate review. 12
4
The United States will likely expose itself politically through a pro-
spective Party's treaty ratification process. U.S. actions domestically and
abroad since September 11 have faced criticism, 1 25 particularly regarding
U.S. immigration, ordinary criminal and military processes. 126 The
United States' position on the Middle East peace process also may compli-
cate treaty negotiations. 12 7 Nonetheless, a continuation and proliferation
of events throughout the Middle East and North Africa since the death of
Yasser Arafat suggest a more hopeful 'outlook for engagement in the
region. 128
Iraq), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2OO4/O5/2OO40512-
2.html.
124. The viability of the Rule of Non-Inquiry may help assuage concerns of a
requesting state, in as much as the Executive retains authority to make particular
decisions. But see Nation in Brief/Los Angeles, WASH. POST, July 26, 2004, at A5 (re-
porting week-long detention of Californian in Egypt and his claim that "he was
beaten" while in custody); World News in Brief/Stockholm, WASH. POST, May 23, 2004,
at A24 (reporting Swedish protest of reported torture in Egypt of two men Sweden
extradited to stand trial for violent acts against Egyptian government).
125. Criticisms of U.S. policy are ubiquitous. See, e.g., Four Former Detainees Sue
U.S. Officials, Seek Damages, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2004, at A13 (describing alleged
human rights violations); Amnesty Int'l, Guantdnamo Bay: A Human Rights Scandal
(asserting that Guantanamo Bay detention center is unlawful), available at http://
web.amnesty.org/pages/ guantanamobay-index-eng (last visited Jan. 26, 2005);
Arab League, News and Declarations (reporting news from perspective that United
States' policies are unlawful), available at http://www.arableagueonline.org/
arableague/indexen.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2005); Arab.net, Mideast News
(same), available at www.arab.net (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
126. For news articles referring to the issue of treatment of individuals, see
supra note 2. For further reference to the Hamdi matter, see supra note 88. For
further discussion of identifying other points of reference, see supra note 122.
127. See generally KAREN ARMSTRONG, BATTLE FOR GOD (2000); KAREN ARM-
STRONG, JERUSALEM ONE CITY THREE FAITHS (1997); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, FROM
BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM (1995); DAVID FROMKIN, A PEACE TO END ALL PEACE (1989);
ABDULAZIS SACHEDINA, THE ISLAMIC ROOTS OF DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM (2001); see
also 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 15, at 47-70 (framing growth of Islamic
extremists in region); Daniel Klaidman & Kevin Peraino, The Riddle of Hizbullah,
NEWSWEEK (Mar. 21, 2005), at 37 (noting that Hizbullah is "admired" in Lebanon);
U. C. Davis Experts: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (providing U.S. perspective on con-
flict), available at http://www.news.ucdavis.edu/sources/israeli.lasso (last visited
Jan. 26, 2005); Alazeera.net, Palestine: The People and the Land (providing Arabic
perspective on Israel-Palestine conflict), at http://english.aljazeera.net/
HomePage (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
128. Steve Coll, Saudi Vote Stirs New Enthusiasm, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2005, at
A14 (noting coalescence of disparate reform groups in Saudi Arabia because of
support for municipal elections); Jackson Diehl, A Mideast Makeover?, WASH. POST,
Feb. 28, 2005, at A17 (drawing attention to "snowballing of events following Iraq's
elections"); Kevin B. Richburg, Nations Vow to Aid Palestinians, WASH. POST, Mar. 2,
2005, at All (noting international conference to pledge financial support for
Palestinians with aim of promoting reform); Kevin Whitelaw, Vox Pop: Protestors
Make Their Voices Heard as Talk of Democracy Echoes Across the Region, U.S. NEWS &
506 [Vol. 50: p. 479
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In the meantime, until negotiations are completed and vitality is in-
fused in the extant extradition treaties, governments should consider tak-
ing more action to promote alternatives to extradition. Passing legislation
or other normative measures to deny or revoke visas is one example. En-
suring that domestic norms permit the denial or revocations of passports
is another. Establishing competent central authorities, 129 apart from po-
lice channels, 130 within respective countries and then promoting direct
communication between these authorities could also further this end.
1 3
'
Regular meetings and conferences can support this communication and
serve to promote further engagement between the United States and
countries in the region.132 Regardless of the approach, engagement is
essential.
VI. CONCLUSION
Extradition and its alternatives are tools that enable governments to
locate, apprehend and return fugitives to face justice. In the context of
the Middle East and North Africa, the focus must be on the alternatives
given a dearth of bilateral extradition treaties between the United States
and countries throughout the region. Until additional extradition treaties
in the region are negotiated and ratified, the U.S. government may have
to rely on domestic prosecutions to ensure that justice is served for specific
cases. As the U.S. government and governments within the region engage
WoRLD REPORT, Mar. 14, 2005, at 25-26 (highlighting changes in region since
death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004).
129. Mutual legal assistance treaties contain provisions designating central au-
thorities to promote direct communications between Parties. See, e.g., Treaty with
Egypt on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Egypt, May 3, 1998, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 19, 106th Cong., 2d Sess., art. 2 (2000) (designating Central
Authorities to promote direct contact between United States and Egypt); Conven-
tion with the Kingdom of Morocco on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Oct.
12, 1983, U.S.-Morocco, S. TirATY Doc. No. 24, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., art. 3 (1984)
(designating Central Authorities in United States and Morocco).
130. Interpol is an effective resource for criminal police communication. For
further discussion of Interpol, see supra note 14. Once specific communication is
required beyond police channels, such as communication between prosecutors,
alternative communication channels should be used. Establishing central points
of contacts meets that end.
131. Direct communication can take myriad forms, such as telephone calls,
facsimile transmission, electronic communications or face-to-face encounters. Re-
gardless of the form, permitting direct communications between the United States
and appropriate host country counterparts is important to advance daily bilateral
law enforcement cooperation efforts in the region. Necessary language training to
facilitate direct communication should be encouraged.
132. See U.S. Dep't of State, Middle East Partnership Initiative (explaining Mid-
dle East Partnership Initiative), at http://mepi.state.gov/mepi/ (last visited Jan.
26, 2005). The U.S. government has also begun to establish strategic dialogue
initiatives within the region. See also Richard Boucher, Press Release at the U.S.-
U.A.E. Strategic Dialogue Meetings, Washington, D.C., Nov. 5, 2002 (Nov. 6, 2002)
(evidencing effort to engage with region), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2002/14960.htm.
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and increase daily, bilateral law enforcement cooperation efforts, the
numbers and kinds of fugitives located, apprehended and returned (or
prosecuted) should increase.
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